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COMMENTS
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-RULE 30(b)(4)-TRIAL JUDGE MAY
DENY MOTION FOR NON-STENOGRAPHIC DEPOSITION ONLY WHEN
PARTICULARS OF REQUEST Do NOT REASONABLY ENSURE ACCURACY
EQUIVALENT TO STENOGRAPHIC DEPOSITION. Colonial Times, Inc. v.
Gasch, 509 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Colonial Times, Inc., publisher of the "underground" news-
paper, "The Daily Rag," sought injunctive relief against interfer-
ence by the United States Postal Service in the regular mail
processing of the newspaper. The publishers alleged that Postal
Service agents, believing an edition of the newspaper to be ob-
scene, advised or coerced subscribers not to accept delivery. Colo-
nial Times further alleged that the Postal Service intended to
monitor future editions of the paper and that the Service had
submitted the edition in question to the Department of Justice
for appropriate action. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 30(b)(4),1 Colonial Times moved to depose certain Postal
Service employees by non-stenographic means. Following objec-
tion by the government, the district court denied the motion on
the ground that the moving party had not demonstrated that
manifest injustice would result from the expense of stenographic
transcription. 2 In Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch,3 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the denial by grant-
ing a petition for mandamus, holding that the range of a trial
judge's discretion under rule 30(b)(4) is limited to those actions
necessary to promote accuracy and trustworthiness and that a
trial judge may deny a 30(b) (4) motion only when he is convinced
that the particulars of the request do not reasonably ensure
accuracy equivalent to stenographic depositions.'
Prior to 1970, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowed
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4) (1970).
2. Colonial Times, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., Civil No. 1633-73 (D.D.C. filed
Dec. 10, 1973), cited in Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
3. Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
4. The Colonial Times opinion is noteworthy not only for its analysis of rule 30(b)(4)
motions, but also for its treatment of the mandamus issue and the issue of whether the
operator of the non-stenographic recorder must be independent of the parties. This com-
ment, however, deals primarily with the threshold issue of the proper scope of judicial
discretion in consideration of a 30(b)(4) motion. The independent operator issue is briefly
treated in note 33 infra.
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only stenographic depositions unless the parties otherwise stipu-
lated in writing. In 1970, the federal rules were amended to per-
mit a trial court judge to order the recording of depositions by
non-stenographic means. Rule 30(b)(4) reads:
The court may upon motion order that the testimony at a
deposition be recorded by other than stenographic means, in
which event the order shall designate the manner of recording,
preserving, and filing the deposition, and may include other
provisions to assure that the recorded testimony will be accurate
and trustworthy. If the order is made, a party may nevertheless
arrange to have a stenographic transcription made at his own
expense.
Because the rule itself fails to specify the conditions under which
to grant a motion for- the use of non-stenographic recording de-
vices, the most obvious source of specific guidelines for judicial
discretion in considering a rule 30(b)(4) motion would seem to be
the Advisory Committee's Note to the rule.' The Committee's
note, however, is itself vague; 7.1 it explicitly acknowledges only
5. Stipulation is allowed by Federal Rule 29 which states, in pertinent part:
Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by written stipulation
(1) provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any time or
place, upon any notice, and in any manner and when so taken may be used like
other depositions, and (2) modify the procedures provided by these rules for
other methods of discovery ....
A sample stipulation form for video taping a deposition is printed in Miller, Video Taping
the Oral Deposition, 18 Pfmc. LAW., Feb. 1972, 45, 57-58 [hereinafter cited as Miller].
In Galley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 30 F.R.D. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), the court held that
audiotape-recorded depositions could not substitute for stenographically recorded deposi-
tions. The court in United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 43 F.R.D. 447 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) stated that video tape depositions could not supplement the standard stenographic
deposition since the then-current federal rules authorized only written depositions.
State procedural rules determine availability of non-stenographic deposition methods
in state courts. South Carolina requires stenographic recording. S.C. Cm. CT. R. 87 H(3)
provides, in pertinent part: "The testimony shall be taken stenographically and tran-
scribed."
6. FED. R. Cir. P. 30(b)(4) (1970).
7. The note states:
In order to facilitate less expensive procedures, provision is made for the
recording of testimony by other than stenographic means-e.g., by mechanical,
electronic, or photographic means. Because these methods give rise to problems
of accuracy and trustworthiness, the party taking the deposition is required to
apply for a court order. The order is to specify how the testimony is to be
recorded, preserved, and filed, and it may contain whatever additional
safeguards the court deems necessary.
7.1. The court in Colonial Times, for example, referred to the Advisory Committee's
Note as "a cryptic commentary." 509 F.2d at 520.
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two concerns: 1) facilitating less expensive recording procedures
and 2) maintaining the accuracy and trustworthiness of deposi-
tions.'
8. The note's failure to supply guidelines for judicial discretion in ruling on rule
30(b)(4) motions has evoked varied comments from the judiciary. See, e.g., Marlboro
Prods. Corp. v. North Am. Phillips Corp., 55 F.R.D. 487, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), in which
the court stated: "The Committee avoided any foolish effort to specify the details of the
orders thus envisioned." See also Perry v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 63 F.R.D. 603, 605 (D.S.C.
1974) in which the court commented that the note "unfortunately" failed to state the basis
on which discretion should be exercised in the consideration of 30(b)(4) motions.
It will be beneficial to understand what recording devices appear to be authorized by
the rule. The Advisory Committee Note provides for "mechanical, electronic, or photo-
graphic means." Conceivably, motion pictures could be used, although movies have disad-
vantages not inherent in other possibilities. Costs, film development delays, special "set"
problems inherent in movie production and problems of viewing the deposition make film
an undesirable method for recording the deposition. See Stewart, Videotape: Use in Dem-
onstrative Evidence, 21 DEFENSE L.J. 253, 255 (1972). Further, movie film cannot later be
erased and reused. Perhaps for these reasons, no reported case has involved a motion for
a movie deposition.
The other types of equipment presently available for taking depositions are video tape
and audiotape recorder-players. Each is available in many degrees of quality, sophistica-
tion and expense. Proponents of expanded use of video tape have written articles advocat-
ing various uses for video including depositions, lawyer self-evaluations and tapings of
entire trials. See, e.g., Kennelly, The Practical Uses of Trialvision and Depovision, 16
TRIAL LAWYEaS GUIDE 183 (1972); McCrystal, The Videotape Trial Comes of Age, 57 J. Aia.
JuD. Soc'y 446 (1974); Merlo & Sorenson, Video Tape: The Coming Courtroom Tool,
TuAL, Nov./Dec. 1971, at 55. These articles have focused on advantages to be gained by
the video tape method, types of equipment best suited for a particular purpose, and
filming and staging techniques to achieve the desired effect. Compare Miller, supra note
5, at 54, which advises that during the taping both the witness and examining attorney
should appear in the picture (to assure that the viewers will fully perceive the attorney's
questions) with Kornblum, Videotape in Civil Cases, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 25 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Kornblum], suggesting possible detrimental effects from filming
both. The suspicion that these "techniques" may be only "tricks" may partially explain
the courts' reluctance to accept too hastily the unbridled use of video-recorded deposi-
tions. Audiotape has had a much less vocal advocacy, although its potential "to facilitate
less expensive procedures" in taking depositions is greater.
What effect video tape ("television") will have on the trier-of-fact merely because it
is television presents an interesting question. We are told that the "medium is the mes-
sage." M. McLuHN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: TIs EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1965). McLuhan's
theory is explained in Dresnick, Uses of the Videotape Recorder in Legal Education, 25
U. MxAi L. REv. 543 (1971):
McLuhan makes it clear that the consequences are a result of the medium and
not the content of a medium, which is another medium, i.e., the content of
writing is speech. This becomes clear when one thinks of the electric light. It is
pure information and contains no message content, unless, of course a series of
lights were arranged in sequence so as to spell out a word. Yet the consequences
of the electric light or "the message of any 'medium' or technology is the change
of scale or pace or pattern it introduces into human affairs . .. ."
McLuhan defines all media as either hot or cool. To cool media he attrib-
utes the characteristics of wholeness, tactileness, inclusiveness, involvement of
3
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Few federal district courts have had occasion to issue orders
granting non-stenographic depositions under rule 30(b)(4),9 and
in only one reported case prior to Colonial Times has a court
refused to grant such an order.A0 The discretion of the individual
judge was certainly critical in each of the reported orders before
Colonial Times, and thus those orders reflect not only all of the
apparent requirements of each situation, but also, to some extent,
the particular judge's acceptance of the innovation and the skill-
fulness of counsel in framing a motion that will satisfy the judge's
standard of acceptable safeguards. The courts which have consid-
ered rule 30(b)(4) motions have emphasized the two interests
delineated in the Advisory Note. For example, in Lucas v.
Curran," a civil rights action in which the plaintiff was a prisoner
in a state penal institution, the court granted plaintiff's motion
to audiotape depositions and stated:
The manifest purpose of the Rule is to facilitate the effec-
tive participation of the economically disadvantaged in the fed-
eral courts, through the lowering of costs as a result of the use
the reader or viewer, low definition, etc. Hot media are highly defined making
them one-way communication, from the packager to the consumer. Their high
definition and sharp features make audience participation impossible. Media,
which McLuhan labels as hot, includes print, radio, film, lecture, and photo-
graph. Cool media includes manuscript, television, and speech (conversational).
Id. at 545 nn. 8 & 9 (emphasis in original).
In 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEaAL PRAMCE AND PROCEDURE: CiVI § 2115 (1970) the
authors opine that photographic means are advantageous
...in that the finder of fact at trial often will gain greater insight from the
manner in which an answer is delivered and recorded by audio-visual devices.
Moreover, a recording, a video tape, or a motion picture of a deposition will
avoid the tedium that is produced when counsel read lengthy depositions into
evidence at trial.
But see Perry v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 63 F.R.D. 603 (D.S.C. 1974) which concluded:
"Depositions have been utilized by courts throughout the country for years and this court
is unaware of any criticism leveled at this practice." Id. at 607. In Perry, the moving party
had referred to the Wright and Miller suggestion that non-stenographic recordings can
help to "avoid tedium" when played for the jury but had given no reason "for the sugges-
tion that any deposition will be published during the trial of this case so as to require
recordation by other [than stenographic] means." Id.
9. Lucas v. Curran, 62 F.R.D. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Jarosiewicz v. Conlisk, 60 F.R.D.
121 (N.D. fI1. 1973); Buck v. Board of Educ., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);
Marlboro Prods. Corp. v. North Am. Phillips Corp., 55 F.R.D. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Wescott v. Neeman, 55 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1972); Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 54 F.R.D. 610
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Carson v. Burlington Northern Inc., 52 F.R.D. 492 (D. Neb. 1971).
10. Perry v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 63 F.R.D. 603 (D.S.C. 1974). For an elaboration
on the holding in Perry, see text accompanying note 36 infra.
11. 62 F.R.D. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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of modem technology. . . . Rule 30(b)(4) should be read in an
attempt to render the ability to bring a suit in federal courts
meaningful."2
The order issued by the court in Lucas is the least confining of
those issued under 30(b) (4).13 At the other end of the line of deci-
sions granting motions for non-stenographic depositions are
Kallen v. Nexus Corp.'4 and Wescott v. Neeman. 5 While recog-
nizing the merits of a more equally open forum, the court in
Kallen cautioned:
[J]ust as the potential is great, so too this. . . is an area which
is not without pitfalls. Of particular concern to the court which
seeks to chart a course in this area, is the preservation of that
level of accuracy and integrity which we have come to associate
with an independent stenographic record ....
. . .Reduced costs will not alone justify a significant reduc-
tion in the quality of the recording produced.'"
Perceiving its task to be the creation of appropriate safeguards to
ensure accuracy, integrity and utility, the Kallen court thus
fashioned very demanding guidelines for the requested audio-
recording of the depositions. 7
12. Id. at 337-38.
13. The order prescribed procedures in lieu of Federal Rule 30 requirements of tran-
scription, signing, certification and filing. The order provided for two tape recorders to
produce two originals of sufficient quality to provide an accurate and trustworthy record.
The operator was not to participate in the actual interrogation process. If the tape was to
be used at trial, the oath was to be administered by a person authorized by law. Speakers
were to identify themselves when necessary. Plaintiff was to transcribe any testimony that
plaintiff or defendant desired, and the original was to be filed with the court. Ten days
were provided for objections, and the court was to compare the original tape in its custody
to the transcript. The transcript was to become the official record. 62 F.R.D. at 339.
14. 54 F.R.D. 610 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
15. 55 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1972). For purposes of clarity the court adopted the
definitions for "original" and "duplicate" of rule 1001, Proposed Rules of Evidence for
United States Courts and Magistrates (Revised draft 1971). The court provided:
Two Originals will be made, each on a separate machine, and each receiving
its signal from the microphones. Specifically, one is not to be the re-recording
of the other, for such. . . would produce a mere "Duplicate."
55 F.R.D. at 258.
16. 54 F.R.D. at 613-14.
17. The guidelines include the traditional allocation of responsibility and costs for the
deposition to the moving party. The recording quality must be high, but as the courts
become more experienced, standards may be lowered, although never below that produced
by stenographic means. The court's demands for technical safeguards included: individual
lavalier microphones, a mike mixer, and a duplicate original tape for each party and one
5
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The court of appeals in Colonial Times concluded that the
district court's construction of rule 30(b)(4), as manifested in its
order denying the motion, was "not consonant with the purposes
of the Rule.""8 In the view of the court of appeals, the district
court's denial of the 30(b) (4) motion was based on a general find-
ing that the dangers to accuracy posed by non-stenographic depo-
sitions required a restricted approach to the use of such alterna-
tive methods.'9 The court of appeals rejected this reasoning and
its underlying "notion that the dangers to accuracy are in the
abstract sufficient reasons for a denial."2 Instead, the court of
appeals adopted a liberal view of the use of 30(b)(4) premised on
the idea that "'experimentation . . . should be encduraged
rather than blocked. ' "21
The point of contention between the two courts arose from
their varying interpretations of the rule and the accompanying
Advisory Committee Note. This variance resulted from the lan-
guage of the rule, which states that the trial judge "may" issue
an order permitting non-stenographic depositions. So framed, the
rule requires the trial judge's discretion, yet fails to specify the
extent to which the discretion is to be exercised. The court of
appeals read the note as indicating that such discretion is limited
to ordering adequate safeguards to ensure accuracy and trust-
worthiness. This interpretation necessarily rejects the argument
that the rule, when compared to an earlier draft, implies broad
discretion. Under the preliminary draft of rule 30(b)(4), no court
order was required and the party seeking the deposition simply
designated the desired non-stenographic deposition method,
which was subject only to court order protecting the accuracy of
the product.2 The resulting argument is that, because the rule
for the court. An additional recorder was to serve as a monitor. All recorders were to be
equipped with synchronized digital counters. The operator was to be independent, and
was to make a detailed log/index of the proceedings including subject matter, the exhibits,
the attorneys and the witnesses. Id. at 613-15.
18. 509 F.2d at 520.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 521, quoting Marlboro Prods. Corp. v. North Am. Phillips Corp., 55 F.R.D.
487, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
22. The preliminary draft of rule 30(b)(4) provided:
If a party taking a deposition wishes to have the testimony recorded by other
than stenographic means, the notice shall specify the manner of recording,
preserving, and filing the deposition. The court may require stenographic taking
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as adopted seems to place the entire process under the judge's
discretion, the order is subject to the trial judge's perception of
the need for non-stenographic depositions. The court of appeals
in Colonial Times denied the significance of any differences in
the language of the two drafts and concluded, in a footnote, that
the two forms of the rule are "sufficiently similar" to support its
liberal interpretation.?
The holding of the court of appeals logically follows from its
construction of the rule. Essentially, the district court had viewed
the non-stenographic means as an exception to the general re-
quirement of stenographic deposition, and consequently available
only when certain conditions, such as financial hardship to the
moving party, were present. In the view of the court of appeals,
non-stenographic deposition is intended to be available as a co-
equal alternative to stenographic deposition, and, accordingly, is
subject only to those restrictions imposed on stenographic deposi-
tion. Absent a protective order, each party to a civil suit has a
right to depose the other party; the court of appeals reasoned that
the framers of 30(b) (4), by allowing non-stenographic deposi-
tions, could not have intended to alter that right without explicit
expression. 4 This interpretation correlates rule 26(c) protective
order considerations, such as annoyance, oppression and undue
burdening, with the 30(b) (4) motion.2 Under this view, the mere
objection of an opposing party to a non-stenographic form of re-
cording a deposition does not require the stenographic form. The
Proposed Amendments to Civil Rules, 43 F.R.D. 211, 239 (1967). The accompanying note
stated, in pertinent part:
[T]he party taking the deposition is required to specify how the testimony is
to be recorded, preserved, and filed, and the court has broad discretion to issue
orders as needed.
Id at 244.
23. 509 F.2d at 521 n.5.
24. Id. at 521. Two points should be noted concerning this discussion by the court.
First, the holding in Colonial Times is fully sustained by careful analysis of the actual
language of rule 30(b)(4) and the Advisory Committee Note; it therefore is entirely sup-
portable even without further argument. Second, it appears that there may be some
logical inconsistency in this additional justification for the court's holding. The court
argues, in effect, that the traditional general rule for taking and recording deposi-
tions-i.e., a right to depose and record stenographically qualified only by considerations
that would justify a rule 26(c) protective order-applies unless specifically altered to all
deposition methods acceptable under the rules. This argument, however, appears to as-
sume the very holding which it is intended to support-that general acceptance of non-
stenographic deposition (as a co-equal alternative to stenographic deposition) is conferred
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opposing party must make "specific objections to the proposed
method of deposition taking and may not simply argue that every
proposed method is insufficient.
'2
Under the holding of the court of appeals, the trial judge is
to ensure that the means of deposition is approximately as accu-
rate as stenographic deposition and that the objecting party's
interests are not prejudiced.Y Summarizing its view of the nature
of the trial judge's discretion in considering a 30(b) (4) motion, the
court of appeals stated:
The judge may deny a movant's request under Rule 30(b)(4)
only when he is convinced, after thorough examination of the
movant's proposal and on the basis of the other party's specific
objections and the judge's experience with the differing forms of
deposition procedure, that the particulars of the request do not
reasonably ensure accuracy equivalent to stenographic deposi-
tions."
The opinion of the court of appeals, requiring both definite-
ness in objection and thoroughness in review of the movant's
proposed method of deposition, should prevent any out-of-hand
rejections of 30(b)(4) motions. It should, that is, if the judge's
experience is never given greater weight than it deserves. Indeed,
such experience properly appears to be significant only as a ter-
tiary consideration. For example, an individual judge's lack of
exposure to non-stenographic methods of recording should not be
a basis for denying a proposal which accurately preserves the
deponent's testimony.
The opinion of the court of appeals also opened new ground
in regard to consideration of movant's financial ability. The
plaintiff in Colonial Times stressed its financial inability to pay
for stenographic depositions. The district court found that mani-
fest injustice would not be imposed on the plaintiff by the cost of
stenographic deposition. It is not surprising that plaintiff argued
financial "need;" almost all previous cases have cited the neces-
sity of reducing costs in the deposition process. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, however, the court of appeals stated:
The ability of the movant to pay for stenographic depositions
should, as a general matter, be irrelevant to the grant of an
26. Id.
27. Id. at 522.
28. Id.
29. At this point, the court of appeals inserted a qualifying footnote which stated:
[Vol. 26
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order to take depositions by other than stenographic means. The
Rule is designed to decrease everyone's stenographic costs when-
ever that can be accomplished with no loss of accuracy and
integrity."
This treatment of the financial issue is not only consistent with
the court's liberal interpretation of the rule but also is logical and
persuasive. The opening words of the Advisory Committee's Note
("In order to facilitate less expensive procedure . . .") are most
logically read as stating an underlying policy reason for the rule,
and not as prescribing a condition of its applicability; although
it might have done so, the note did not provide "If the movant
can demonstrate his need to reduce litigation expenses." With
the liberal admission of non-stenographic depositions, the
wealthy may profit as much as the poor from the advantages of
non-stenographic depositions.3
Nevertheless, the vagueness of the court's footnote caveat,
concerning the consideration of a moving party's ability to pay for
stenographic depositions in "marginal cases of need,13 2 may
weaken the dictum to the effect that the ability to pay for steno-
graphic records generally should be "irrelevant" in considering a
rule 30(b)(4) motion. Although the footnote needs clarification,
courts should not interpret it as permitting a blanket denial such
as that issued by the district court in Colonial Times. To inter-
pret it in that way would be to permit the movant's financial
"We, of course, do not mean to hold that ability to pay may never be relevant in marginal
cases of need, when the trial judge is not satisfied with the movant's proposed deposition
method." Id. at 521 n.8.
30. Id. at 521.
31. One such advantage is illustrated by Carson v. Burlington Northern Inc., 52
F.R.D. 492 (D. Neb. 1971), the first case involving a 30(b)(4) motion. Carson was a
personal injury action in which the defendant railroad sought to video tape a deposition
in the blacksmith shop where plaintiff's accident had occurred. The court in Carson
stated: "The purpose of the deposition of the plaintiff by stenographic and photographic
means is to demonstrate the manner in which the plaintiff operated the said machine at
the time of and immediately prior to the accident." Id. at 492. Plaintiff objected to the
video taping on the ground that, rather than producing a "natural" recreation of events,
the video tape result would appear "staged" so as to make the plaintiff appear contributo-
rily negligent. While admitting the possibility of prejudice if satisfactory safeguards were
not devised, the court said the rules were amended "so as to allow just such a procedure"
(as video tape]. Id. In granting the defendant's motion, the court provided certain
safeguards to ensure the accuracy and trustworthiness of the recording process and the
tape. One such safeguard was the requirement that the plaintiff not touch or operate the
machine, and that instead he use only a suitable pointer or other means acceptable to
counsel. Id. at 493.
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capabilities to become once again a "relevant" factor in ruling on
a 30(b)(4) motion. Ordinarily, a judge should first evaluate the
motion in light of the moving party's suggested safeguards and
the opposing party's specific objections to determine whether the
proposed method of deposition poses any danger to accuracy.
Only then should a court consider the issue of financial need;
moreover, even if the trial judge is not completely satisfied with
the requested method of recording depositions, he should consider
financial need itself only as a factor permitting a 30(b)(4) motion
and not as a factor denying it. It is of course possible to interpret
the footnote as a suggestion that a judge, dissatisfied with a pro-
posed recording method, might deny the motion of a party who
does not have the ability to pay for stenographic recording; such
a reading, however, appears inconsistent with the court's later
holding that limits judicial discretion. In no case should a court
base a total denial of a rule 30(b)(4) motion upon the movant's
ability to afford a stenographic deposition. If a real danger to
accuracy and trustworthiness exists, and if stenographic costs do
not place a particular burden on the moving party, then it would
seem most reasonable to condition the granting of the motion on
the willingness of the movant to vary his proposal by adding or
substituting a safeguard which may entail additional costs, such
as an independent operator's fees. 33 If, on the other hand, the
33. An issue which has caused considerable problems for the courts dealing with
30(b)(4) motions is whether the operator of the tape recorder or other zion-stenographic
device must be independent of the parties. See, e.g., Marlboro Prods. Corp. v. North Am.
Phillips Corp., 55 F.R.D. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The defendant in Marlboro Products op-
posed plaintiff's 30(b)(4) motion primarily on the ground that Federal Rules 28(a), 28(c)
and 30(f) required an independent recorder operator. Rule 28(a) provides in pertinent
part:
[Diepositions shall be taken before an officer authorized to administer oaths
. . . or before a person appointed by the court ....
Rule 28(c) states:
No deposition shall be taken before a person who is a relative or employee
or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, or is a relative or employee of such
attorney or counsel, or is financially interested in the action.
Although it recognized the defendant's argument as substantial, the court in Marlboro
Products concluded that it was not always necessary that an independent person operate
the recorder:
The employment of such a person serves to impair pro tanto the purpose of
economy. It is not a technological necessity. . . . The supposed need for neu-
trality in the operator seems likely to prove illusory in the actual circumstances
of the deposition proceeding. . . . Opposing counsel and others who may at-
tend will serve to guard against mistakes or misbehavior.
55 F.R.D. at 489.
The court of appeals in Colonial Times reasoned that, since the purpose of rule
[Vol. 26762
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movant is an indigent, or if there is a need for cost reduction to a
non-indigent, and the danger to accuracy appears slight, then the
court should interpret the footnote to allow the motion. Moreover,
the court of appeals in Colonial Times indicated an intent to
promote generous granting of rule 30(b)(4) motions: "A liberal
view of Rule 30(b) (4), designed to encourage experimentation to
30(b)(4) is to reduce expenses and since the independent operator would be perhaps the
most significant expense in a deposition proceeding, "the operator should be eliminated
unless no alternatives exist to guarantee trustworthiness." 509 F.2d at 522. The court then
suggested several alternatives to the independent operator to be considered "in light of
the over-all spirit of experimentation that animates Rule 30(b)(4)." Id. at 523. The court,
at 522-23, said:
Several safeguards which might provide an alternative to the independent oper-
ator have been suggested. First, the testimony may be recorded on two recorders
and the opposing party may retain the tape from the second record. Second, the
original tape once made should be deposited with the Court directly after the
deposition to serve as a check on the accuracy of a transcript made subsequent
to the deposition. Third, the witness must read a transcript of the recording
made by the moving party and sign it under oath before the transcript may be
admitted in evidence. The District Court should carefully consider whether
these safeguards are sufficient to dispense with the independent operator ...
We, of course, do not mean by this opinion to foreclose any conclusion based
upon experience in the use of depositions in which the operator is not indepen-
dent of the parties. Id. at 522-23.
One danger observed in the commentary on denial of 30(b)(4) motions, (See text
following note 28 supra), is also present in the consideration of the need for independent
operators. The court's reference to the individual judge's experience may be interpreted
as license for judges inexperienced with non-stenographic recording to disregard the other
factors the court in Colonial Times deemed important. Here the court's caveat shows an
understanding that this is still a relatively unexplored area. Future trial courts may find
as a practical matter that certain alternatives do not work and that accuracy and trustwor-
thiness can only be maintained by an independent operator. At that point, after some
period of experimentation with non-stenographic devices, experience may show the ne-
cessity for an operator independent of the parties.
The court of appeals appears to have handled correctly the independent operator
issue. Although it did not expressly consider the question of the interrelationship of
30(b)(4) and the other deposition rules, the Colonial Times decision reasoned from the
purposes of the 30(b)(4) amendment. The language of the rule also supports the result.
The statement in rule 30(b)(4) that "the order shall designate the manner of recording,
preserving, and filing the deposition" would be unnecessary if the court's duty were simply
to copy provisions from other rules. The drafters, realizing that they could not properly
provide for the varying demands of different situations, wisely left this aspect to the
discretion of the individual judge. That discretion should, of course, be directed to the
same ends which the procedures set out in other rules attempt to achieve-preservation
of accurate and trustworthy testimony.
In large measure, an order which closely tracks the certification and filing require-
ments for stenographic depositions will naturally ensue from the determination by the
court that accuracy and integrity demand an independent operator for the recording
device. It would not appear, however, that such a result is required. See Kallen v. Nexus
Corp., 54 F.R.D. 610, 615 (N.D. Ill. 1972), in which the court stated: "The operator shall
11
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reduce costs, surely is an important step towards a more eco-
nomic system of justice."34
To support its interpretation of the rule, the court of appeals
in Colonial Times cited prior cases granting 30(b)(4) motions35
and attempted to distinguish Perry v. Mohawk Rubber
Company,35 the only reported case in which such a motion was
denied. In Perry, an action based on tortious conspiracy to inter-
fere intentionally with plaintiff's business, the plaintiff filed a
motion to record depositions by video tape in addition to steno-
graphic transcription. The South Carolina District Court denied
the motion on two grounds: (1) plaintiff failed to show that the
use of videotape would reduce the costs of taking depositions, and
(2) plaintiff failed to show that a need existed for videotaping. 3
certify the correctness and completeness of the recordings in the manner that a steno-
graphic reporter certifies the typed record of a deposition." See Wescott v. Neeman, 55
F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1972), which used basically the same language but prefaced it with
the statement that "[alt the close of the deposition the independent third party shall
vocally record his certification." Id. at 258. Whether this vocal certification was meant as
an additional requirement is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, to make the 30(b)(4) motion
and its proposed safeguards appear as "familiar" as possible, the attorney framing the
motion may wish to follow the standard procedures for stenographic depositions. In any
case in which an independent third party will record the deposition, no problem should
be presented. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(f)(1) requires the officer to certify that the witness was
duly sworn and that the testimony is a true record. This formality could be easily video
taped or vocally recorded. See Miller, supra note 5, at 48, and Westcott v. Neeman, supra,
at 258. Alternatively, a "sticker" with this typed information could be affixed to the tape
or reel. The duty of the officer to seal the deposition in an envelope aid file it can be
followed as easily with the tape record as with a stenographic transcription. See Miller,
supra note 5, at 49. The requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 30(f)(2) that the officer furnish a
copy of the deposition to the deponent or any party is no obstacle. Either a video or sound
recording could be made depending upon the party's need; audio tape and equipment are
common and copies are easily made. If video tape is the medium and if only one side has
video equipment, the witness and the opposing party should have the right to view the
video tape prior to trial. See Kornblum, supra note 8, at 25. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(e) provides
the witness with the opportunity to examine his deposition unless he and the parties waive
that right. The deposition is to be signed unless there is a written stipulation to the
contrary by the parties. The choice of the words "transcribe" and "read" may mean to
exempt 30(b)(4) recordings since the court's supervisory powers are an adequate assurance
of accuracy. See Kornblum, supra note 8, at 24; Miller, supra note 5, at 48-49. Neverthe-
less, it would be no problem to arrange a viewing or bearing of the tape at which time a
vocal "signature" or any requested changes could be recorded. Alternatively, a signed
label could be attached. See Marlboro Prods. Corp. v. North Am. Phillips Corp., 55
F.R.D., 487, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
34. 509 F.2d at 525.
35. See cases cited in note 9 supra.
36. 63 F.R.D. 603 (D.S.C. 1974).
37. Id. at 607.
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The Perry court summarized its view of the nature of the trial
judge's discretion under 30(b)(4) as follows:
When a request for non-stenographic recording is motivated by
genuine economic considerations and is consistent with insuring
adequate discovery and preventing possible suffocation of the
truth, the rules provide federal trial courts with the flexibility
to accede; but when such a request demands a concession for no
better reason than the personal preference of a single party, Rule
30(b) (4) also invests the courts with the discretion to refuse it.,
The court of appeals in Colonial Times dealt with Perry in a
footnote:
[Perry] may be distinguished as involving a frivolous request
for a video tape deposition and the denial thereof analogized to
a Rule 26(c) protective order. And we might be inclined to agree
that where deposition by non-stenographic means is burden-
some on the parties, the movant must show more than "personal
preference" . . . to obtain a court order. However, it appears
that Perry is not fully consistent with the liberal view of Rule
30(b) (4) outlined herein.39
The court's method of distinguishing Perry is curious. Presuma-
bly, under the holding in Colonial Times, there is no such thing
as a "frivolous request" for a 30(b) (4) deposition, and the movant
is not required to demonstrate a "need" for non-stenographic
transcription. Unfortunately, the language used to distinguish
Perry does not indicate the extent to which such considerations
of a movant's motives should enter into the trial judge's exercise
of discretion. As a result, the court of appeals may have created
an exception otherwise not apparent on the face of its holding.
Despite the need for clarification of its theoretical caveats,
however, the opinion of the court of appeals in Colonial Times
firmly underwrites a viable and liberalized implementation of
rule 30(b) (4). The opinion emphasizes the opportunity for experi-
mentation with new procedural techniques occasioned by the
adoption of rule 30(b) (4). Additionally, by removing the require-
ment that a movant show financial need, the court of appeals
provides a means of reducing litigation costs for all parties.
38. Id.
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EVIDENCE-POLYGRAPH TESTS-THE RESULTS OF A POLYGRAPH
TEST ARE ADMISSIBLE IF THE DEFENDANT AGREES IN ADVANCE TO THE
ADMISSION OF THE RESULTS REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME.
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass.
1974).
In Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1),1 the defendant was
charged with delinquency by reason of manslaughter and inoved
for the admission into evidence of the results of a polygraph ex-
amination administered to him by two polygraph experts of his
own choosing. Defendant offered testimony concerning the scien-
tific reliability and scientific acceptability of the polygraph, the
manner in which the test was administered to the defendant, and
the opinion of the examiner regarding the truthfulness of defen-
dant's answers to questions relevant to the case. Defendant also
requested that the court order an additional test by a court-
appointed expert or by an expert of the state's choosing. The trial
judge denied the motions. 2 On appeal, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded in a 4-3 decision, holding
that the results of a polygraph test were admissible in evidence
at the discretion of the trial judge provided the defendant agrees
in advance to the admission of the results regardless of the test's
outcome.'
The generally accepted rule regarding the admissibility of
polygraph test results was first enunciated in Frye v. United
States: for the results to be admissible, the scientific test "from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs." 5 While some recent decisions criticize current appli-
cations of Frye for being too restrictive,6 the great majority of
1. 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974).
2. Id. at 122-23.
3. Id. at 124.
4. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5. Id. at 1014.
6. See United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam,
470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973). The district court noted
that the majority interpretation of Frye places greater restrictions on polygraph results
than on other scientific evidence. Although following the Frye rule because of precedent,
the court appeared to prefer the test recommended by Professor McCormick which distin-
guishes between taking judicial notice and admissibility and concludes that any relevant
conclusions supported by a qualified expert should be admitted providing the probative
value is greater than the dangers of misleading the jury or the risk of consuming an undue
amount of time. 348 F. Supp. at 1382-84. See C. McCoRMIcK, EvmuENc § 203, at 491 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK].
766
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jurisdictions still adhere closely to its test of general scientific
acceptance.' As a result, these courts generally hold that poly-
graph results are not admissible evidence for either substantive
or impeachment purposes.'
The most significant recent development in the polygraph
area has occurred in the growing number of jurisdictions which
recognize the admissibility of polygraph results pursuant to a
stipulation by the parties? California is often credited with begin-
ning this trend in People v. Houser,"0 but it is the Arizona decision
of State v. Valdez" that is considered the leading case on admissi-
bility pursuant to a stipulation. 2 In Valdez, the defendant ob-
jected to the admission of testimony concerning the results of his
polygraph test although he had stipulated before trial that the
examiner's testimony would be admissible."3 The court noted that
"although polygraph interrogation has not attained that degree
of scientific acceptance . . . to be admissible at the first instance
of either the state or defendant, . . . it has been considerably
improved [since Frye] .14 The court in Valdez held that poly-
graphic testing had improved to such an extent that the results
were sufficiently probative to be admitted upon stipulation. Four
qualifications for admissibility were imposed: (1) the county at-
torney, defendant and his counsel must all sign a written stipula-
tion providing for defendant's submission to the test and for ad-
mission at the trial of the graphs and of the examiner's opinion;
(2) the non-offering party has the right to cross-examine the testi-
fying examiner; (3) the trial judge retains discretion as to the
examiner's qualifications, proper test conditions, and other fac-
7. See, e.g., People v. Leone, 25 N.Y. 2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430
(1969); State v. Britt, 235 S.C. 395, 111 S.E.2d 669 (1959); Lee v. Commonwealth, 200
Va. 233, 105 S.E.2d 152 (1958). See also cases collected in 29 AM. Jur. 2d Evidence § 831
(1967).
8. See McCoRMICK § 207, at 506.
9. See State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960); State v. Fields, 434
S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968); State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36, 297 A.2d 849 (1972); State v.
Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974); State v. Towns, 35 Ohio App. 2d 237,
301 N.E.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1973); State v. Bennett, 521 P.2d 31 (Ore. Ct. App. 1974); State
v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343 (Ct. App. 1972). For a discussion of the desirabil-
ity of the exception and of the admissibility of polygraph tests generally, see Note, The
Polygraph Revisited: An Argument for Admissibility, 4 SueroLK L. REv. 111 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Suffolk Note].
10. 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (Ct. App. 1948). See McCoaaUcK § 207, at 507.
11. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
12. Annot., 53 A.L.R. 3d 1005, 1008 (1973).
13. 91 Ariz. at 275-76, 371 P.2d at 895.
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tors relevant to the admissibility of the test results; and (4) the
judge should instruct the jury that the examiner's testimony is
not conclusive proof but at most indicates only that the defen-
dant was or was not telling the truth at the time the test was
administered, and the jury is to determine the weight that such
testimony should be given.' 5
The Valdez rationale recognizes that polygraphic test results
have some probative value, and it seeks to balance the limitations
of polygraph reliability with the requirement that both parties
stipulate to admissibility and thus assume any probative risks. 6
Because of the condition that both parties stipulate, the prosecu-
tion retains a significant negotiating and tactical advantage."7
Under the Valdez rule, the prosecutor may simply refuse to stipu-
late in a case which he considers "open and shut."'" Should the
prosecutor agree to stipulation, however, he would have some
input in the selection of the examiner.
Prior to Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), the Frye test
of general scientific acceptance had been the criterion for admis-
sibility in all circumstances in Massachusetts. In Commonwealth
v. Fatalo,'5 the Massachusetts Supreme Court observed in 1963
that scientific tests such as blood tests, ballistics, fingerprints,
and alcohol content of the blood had been accepted by the courts
but noted that their acceptance followed scientific recognition
which had not been accorded the polygraph. The court stated,
15. Id. at 283-84, 371 P.2d at 900-01.
16. Cf. Suffolk Note, supra note 9, at 124-25; Comment, Criminal Law-Pre-Trial
Immunity Agreement-Binding Both Sides to Results of Polygraph Tests Upheld as a
Pledge of Public Faith, 16 N.Y.L.F. 646, 652-53 (1970).
17. In State v. Forgan, 104 Ariz. 497, 455 P.2d 975 (1969), the Arizona Supreme Court
applied the Valdez rule and denied admission of polygraph test results when the county
attorney refused to stipulate admissibility. Referring to the first qualification of Valdez
(that the county attorney, the defendant and his counsel all sign the stipulation), the court
held that the county attorney's refusal to stipulate could be justified for the same reasons
usually advanced by proponents of general inadmissibility of polygraph results. Id at 498,
455 P.2d at 976. Apparently the court in Forgan was referring to such problems as untesta-
ble persons, lack of acceptance by scientists, tendency of judges and juries to treat test
results as conclusive evidence, lack of standardization of test procedure and examiner
qualifications. See State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. at 278-80, 371 P.2d at 897-98.
In State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa 334, 125 N.W.2d 825 (1964), the Iowa Supreme Court,
which had first admitted polygraph testimony pursuant to a stipulation in State v. McNa-
mara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960), ruled that the trial court correctly rejected
defendant's motion to require the state to give him a polygraph test. The court reasoned
that without the prosecutor's consent the results would be inadmissible and therefore
sustaining defendant's motion would be futile.
18. See State v. Boodry, 96 Ariz. 259, 394 P.2d 196 (1964).
19. 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963).
[Vol. 26
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"We do not hold that such recognition must be universal or that
the test must be proven infallible, but rather that the substantial
doubts which presently revolve about the polygraph test must be
removed."20
Although it stated that the Fatalo test of scientific accept-
ance had not been met,2' the court in Commonwealth v. A Juve-
nil (No. 1) justified its decision to allow limited admissibility of
the polygraph test results by relying heavily on the "substantial
advances . . . made in the field of polygraphy" since Fatao.12
The court cited the increased sophistication and professionalism
of the examiners, the refinement of the machine, and the growing
use of the polygraph in governmental, scientific, legal and private
circles. The court in Juvenile noted that "polygraph testing has
advanced to the point where it could prove to be of significant
value to the criminal trial process if its admissibility initially is
limited to carefully defined circumstances designed to protect the
proper and effective administration of criminal justice.",, The
court in Juvenile adopted a rule identifying four situations in
which a trial judge may, in his discretion, admit results of a
polygraph test: (1) when the defendant moves that he be allowed
to submit to an examination by an examiner of his own choosing;
(2) when the defendant moves that an examination be given by
an expert chosen by the state; (3) when the defendant moves that
the court appoint an examiner; or (4) when the defendant moves
that a test be given by an examiner selected by the defendant and
an examiner selected by the state. In all four instances the defen-
dant must agree in advance that the results will be admissible
regardless of the outcome of the test. After the court makes writ-
ten findings that the defendant's consent was voluntary and
knowing, the test may be conducted. The prosecutor receives a
copy of the results which are admissible upon introduction by
either the prosecution or the defense; any request for admission,
however, is subject to the trial judge's discretion following voir
dire inquiry into the examiner's qualifications.
2 4
20. Id. at 270, 191 N.E.2d at 481.
21. 313 N.E.2d at 123-24. Of greatest concern to the court was the fact that polygra-
phy had not achieved a predictable level of consistency among examiners and was still
challenged on theoretical grounds by some scientists. Id. at 125.
22. Id. at 122.
23. Id. at 124.
24. Id. at 126-27. The court declined to establish minimum qualifications for all
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The decision in Juvenile was based largely upon increased
confidence in the reliability of polygraphy, but the court ob-
viously was also influenced by the defendant's own request for the
test and his stipulation prior to its administration that the results
would be admissible. The court observed that a defendant who
has agreed "to abide by the results of a yet to be taken polygraph
examination," may be "highly motivated to assure that the ex-
aminer is well qualified and that the test is conducted under
proper conditions."" Thus, in Juvenile, the defendant's assump-
tion of the risk and his resulting motivation to choose the exam-
iner carefully appear to have been the factors which overcame the
court's remaining doubts about the reliability of the tests.
Juvenile does not overrule Fatalo; general scientific accept-
ance remains the underlying test for general admissibility of poly-
graph evidence in Massachusetts. The court, however, did at-
tempt to relax the Frye/Fatalo standards by embracing and ex-
tending the stipulation rationale of Valdez. The significant break
with the stipulation cases, however, is that Juvenile does not
require a prosecutor to stipulate to either the qualifications of the
examiner or the admissibility of the test.
Because the Juvenile court failed to resolve the issue of poly-
graph reliability, it may have acted prematurely in eliminating
the prosecutor's power to exclude polygraph evidence solely by
his refusal to stipulate. Under two options of the new Massachu-
setts rule-when either the defendant or the court selects the
examiner-the prosecutor would have no voice in the selection
process. As the court in Juvenile recognized, the competence of
the examiner is vital to the reliability of the test and the profes-
sion has yet to achieve a uniform level of competence.2 6 As a result
of the new rule, the trial judge will determine the competency of
the examiner without the acquiescence of the prosecutor. Such a
procedure is at odds with the assumed risk rationale of the Valdez
line of cases.
The impact of excluding the prosecutor from the examiner
selection process would be lessened if the prosecutor could subject
the defendant to a second test administered by the state's ex-
perts; this option is presently available whenever blood tests or
psychiatric evaluations are involved. But the court in Juvenile,
citing Schmerber v. California,7 stated that a polygraph test is
25. Id, at 126.
26. Id. at 124-25. See also Suffolk Note, supra note 9, 112-13.
27. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the Court stated that "[the fifth amend-
[Vol. 26
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essentially testimonial in nature and that a defendant could not
be compelled "initially" to submit to such a test." This reasoning
implies that the prosecutor would be precluded from testing the
defendant and prevented from producing as his own witness any
expert who had personally tested the defendant.
29
Although the Juvenile rule eliminates the requirement of
prosecutor consent to admissibility and may preclude the state's
retesting of the defendant, the prosecutor may still be able to
exclude or to reduce the impact of unfavorable polygraph test
results. The prosecutor may be able to prevent the defendant's
expert from testifying by objecting to the examiner's qualifica-
tions or to the conditions under which the test was given. Should
the testimony be admitted over the prosecutor's objection, the
prosecutor would have the right to cross-examine the expert on
his qualifications, the methdd of conducting the test, the opera-
tion of the machine and the theoretical soundness of the assump-
tions upon which polygraphy is based." The prosecutor further
could attempt to limit the effectiveness of the examiner's testi-
mony by calling his own expert witnesses on the reliability of
polygraphic testing in general as well as the test described by the
examiner in particular.3 Finally, the prosecutor can request that
the judge charge the jury, in accordance with the court's language
in Juvenile, that the results of the polygraph test are to be consid-
ered not as binding or conclusive evidence but are to be consid-
ered together with all other evidence as to guilt or innocence. 2
ment] privilege is a bar against compelling 'communications' or 'testimony,' but that
compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of'real or physical evidence' does
not violate [the privilege]." Id. at 764.
28. 313 N.E.2d at 127.
29. The dissenters in Juvenile suggested that it might not be desirable or possible to
preclude the state from retesting a defendant who offers polygraph testimony. Id. at 137.
While not conclusively answering this question, the majority stated that, although no
defendant can be compelled "initially" to submit to a polygraph examination, a defendant
who does agree to take a test waives his fifth amendment rights "to that extent." Id. at
127. The import of this language, however, is problematic; it could mean that when the
defendant in Juvenile submitted to the original test he waived any right he had to refuse
to submit to a polygraph test given by the state. But the language logically appears to
refer to the original test taken at the request of the defendant; if so, only "to that extent"
had defendant waived his rights, and the prosecutor was thus precluded from forcing the
defendant to submit to a second test by the state's experts.
30. The court provides for a broad cross-examination of an examiner who is an oppos-
ing witness regardless of who originally selected the expert. Id. at 127.
31. The dissent suggests that the Juvenile rule has the potential for turning the trial
into a battle of experts. Id. at 136.
32. Id. at 124. Some courts submit that juries will consider the machine infallible and
19
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While significantly increasing the defendant's options, the
decision also raises problems when viewed from the defendant's
perspective. The Juvenile rule forces the defendant to gamble
that the tests will be favorable and to bear the risk of having the
prosecutor introduce the results if they are unfavorable to defen-
dant.3 Thus, it could be argued that the court, in its desire to
open up a potentially valuable area of evidence, has adopted a
rule which borders on trial by ordeal.
The Juvenile rule is a commendable attempt at compromise.
The court has taken a significant new stance in the continuing
debate over the polygraph by promulgating what appears to be
the broadest rule of admissibility yet adopted by a state supreme
court. The court recognized the polygraph as a viable evidentiary
tool to be used in certain defined circumstances, and the decision
surely must be viewed as an advancement by advocates of the
polygraph. Yet, since the court was not prepared to find that the
polygraph is on a par with accepted scientific tests, the result is
a rule which poses problems for both prosecutors and defendants
in the context of an adversary system.
that the polygraph therefore should be infallible before the testimony of the examiner is
admitted. See cases cited in MCCORMICK, § 207, at 507, § 203, at 490 n.32. Apparerttly,
the Juvenile court disagreed.
33. The requirement that a copy of the results be given to the prosecution raises
serious fifth amendment questions. See United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1195 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) in which the court states that a defendant has a right to compel the state to
investigate its own case, find its own evidence and prove its own facts.
[Vol. 26
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